Abstract. The classical design principle 6] is scrutinized by many ways such as Joux's multicollision attack, Kelsey-Schneier second preimage attack etc. In TCC'04, Maurer et al. introduced a strong security notion called as "indifferentiability" for a hash function based on a compression function. The classical design principle is also insecure against this strong security notion whereas chopMD hash is secure with the security bound roughly σ 2 /2 s where s is the number of chopped bits and σ is the total number of message blocks queried by a distinguisher. In case of n = 2s where n is the output size of a compression function, the value σ to get a significant bound is 2 s/2 which is the birthday complexity, where the hash output size is s-bit. In this paper, we present an improved security bound for chopMD. The improved bound shown in this paper is (3(n − s) + 1)q/2 s + q/2 n−s−1 + σ 2 /2 n+1 where q is the total number of queries. In case of n = 2s, chopMD is indifferentiably-secure if q = O(2 s /(3s + 1)) and σ = O(2 n/2 ) which are beyond the birthday complexity. We also present a design principle for an n-bit hash function based on a compression function f : {0, 1} 2n+b → {0, 1} n and show that the indifferentiability security bound for this hash function is roughly (3n + 1)σ/2 n . So, the new design of hash function is second-preimage and r-multicollision secure as long as the query complexity (the number of message blocks queried) of an attacker is less than 2 n /(3n + 1) or 2 n(r−1)/r respectively.
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Abstract. The classical design principle Merkle-Damgård [13, 6] is scrutinized by many ways such as Joux's multicollision attack, Kelsey-Schneier second preimage attack etc. In TCC'04, Maurer et al. introduced a strong security notion called as "indifferentiability" for a hash function based on a compression function. The classical design principle is also insecure against this strong security notion whereas chopMD hash is secure with the security bound roughly σ 2 /2 s where s is the number of chopped bits and σ is the total number of message blocks queried by a distinguisher. In case of n = 2s where n is the output size of a compression function, the value σ to get a significant bound is 2 s/2 which is the birthday complexity, where the hash output size is s-bit. In this paper, we present an improved security bound for chopMD. The improved bound shown in this paper is (3(n − s) + 1)q/2 s + q/2 n−s−1 + σ 2 /2 n+1 where q is the total number of queries. In case of n = 2s, chopMD is indifferentiably-secure if q = O(2 s /(3s + 1)) and σ = O(2 n/2 ) which are beyond the birthday complexity. We also present a design principle for an n-bit hash function based on a compression function f : {0, 1} 2n+b → {0, 1} n and show that the indifferentiability security bound for this hash function is roughly (3n + 1)σ/2 n . So, the new design of hash function is second-preimage and r-multicollision secure as long as the query complexity (the number of message blocks queried) of an attacker is less than 2 n /(3n + 1) or 2 n(r−1)/r respectively.
Introduction
In TCC 2004, Maurer et al. [11] introduced the notion of indifferentiability which is more stronger notion than classical indistinguishability security notion. They have shown that if a cryptosystem P(G) based on a random oracle G is secure then the security of P(H F ) based on Merkle-Damgård (MD) [13, 6] hash function H with a random oracle [1, 15] as an underlying compression function, is secure provided the hash function is indifferentiable. Informally, H F is indifferentiable from random oracle if there is no efficient attacker (or distinguisher) which can distinguish F and the hash function based on it from a random oracle R and an efficient simulator of F . Here R is a random oracle with (finite) domain and range same as that of H. In case of Indistinguishability, the distinguisher only needs to tell apart H from G without any help of oracle F . Thus, the notion of indifferentiability is stronger and it is important when we consider attacks on a cryptosystem based on some ideal primitive where the attacker has some access on the computation of the primitive. In the case of hash function H F , the attacker can also compute F as it is a random oracle which can be computed publicly. On the other hand, if the attacker does not have that access (to the random oracle) then merely indistinguishability will suffice to preserve the security of the cryptosystem.
In Crypto 2005, Coron et al. [5] proved that the classical MD iteration is not indifferentiable with random oracle when the underlying compression function is random oracle. They have also stated indifferentiability for chopMD, prefix-free MD (or pfMD), NMAC construction, HMAC construction, and provided a bound for these as O(σ 2 /2 n ) where σ is the total number of message blocks queried by a distinguisher, the hash output size is n, and the number of chopped bits is n. Thus, according to their claim, chopMD is secure in this strong notion as long as the total number of message blocks queried is σ = O(2 n/2 ). In Asiacrypt 2006, Chang et al. [4] also have provided a concrete security analysis of the many indifferentiable hash constructions. They have provided a security analysis for double length hash function based on prefix free padding. In Asiacrypt 2006, Bellare and Ristenpart [2] proposed an indifferentiably-secure domain extension called by EMD which also preserves pseudorandomness and collision resistance. Very recently in Asiacrypt 2007, Hirose et al. [7] introduced an indifferentiablysecure domain extension called by MDP which also preserves pseudorandomness, collision resistance and unforgeability. All of these constructions have bounds of the form of birthday collision probability. Recently in Crypto 2007, Maurer and Tessaro [12] firstly presented a construction which has security beyond the birthday barrier. Table 1 summarizes the security bound of above constructions.
Our Results. In this paper, we prove a better bound of chopMD which is beyond the birthday bound. We prove that chopMD is secure if σ = O(2 n/2 ) and the number of queries Q = O(min(2 n−s−1 , 2 s 3(n−s)+1 )), where n is the output length of the compression function and s is the chopped bit length and σ is the total number of message blocks queried. When s = n/2 our bound shows that chopMD is secure as long as the number of queries is less that 2 s /(3s + 1) which is better than the original proposal (where security is guaranteed only when the number of queries is less than 2 s/2 ). As a result we propose a wide pipe version of MD-hash function which is second-preimage and r-multicollision secure as long as the query complexity (the number of message blocks queried) of an attacker is less than 2 n /(3n + 1) or 2 n(r−1)/r respectively. This hash function is more efficient to the Lucks' [10] wide pipe hash design as our hash function does not need the post-processor.
Domain Extensions
The value σ to get a significant bound chopMD [5] prefix-free MD [4, 5] NMAC construction [5] 2
: the Birthday Bound HMAC construction [5] EMD [2] MDP [7] prefix-free chopMD [12] Organization. In section 2, we first state some important definitions and results related to our paper. We state an important result known as strong interpolation theorem in this section. Then in Section 3, we provide a concrete and improved security analysis for chopMD. As an application of the improved security analysis of chopMD, we propose a secure chopDBL hash design in section 4. Finally, we conclude.
Some Notations and Results
Counting. Let F := Func(n+b, n), the set of all functions f : {0,
n . It is easy to see that |F | = 2 n2 n+b . Now, for any distinct a i 's, the number of functions f such that f (a 1 ) = z 1 , · · · , f (a q ) = z q is exactly 2 n(2 n+b −q) because, the outputs of q elements are fixed and the rest (2 n+b − q) many outputs can be chosen in (2 n )
where u is the uniform random function on F (an uniform random variable taking values on F ).
Inequalities. P(m, r) = m(m − 1) · · · (m − r + 1) where 0 ≤ r ≤ m. By our convention, P(m, 0) = 1. We state two inequalities which will be used in this paper.
) where m ≥ x + r. This is followed from ineq-1, by choosing
MD-hash. We fix an initial value IV ∈ {0, 1} n throughout the paper. Given a function f : {0, 1} n+b → {0, 1} n we define
where m i ∈ {0, 1} b . MD f is popularly known as Merkle-Damgård hash function with underlying compression function f . We define MD f (λ) = IV where λ is the empty string.
In this paper, we fix 0 < s < n and define chopMD
Padding. Note that both MD and chopMD have domain ({0, 1} b ) + . We write
We say any injective function pad :
is not a prefix of pad(M 2 ). For any such prefix-free padding rule pad, pfMD is defined as follows. pfMD
View. In this paper we consider a distinguisher A which has access of two oracles O 1 and O 2 . We assume that A is deterministic and computationally unbounded 1 . We assume that all queries are distinct and it makes at most Q i queries to the oracle O i . Suppose A makes M i as O 1 -query and obtains
is called as the view of A. We also denote v O1,O2 to specify that the view is obtained after interacting with O 1 and O 2 . We also denote i-th query-response pair by (X i , Y i ), where X i = (x j , m j ) or X i = M j for a j. So we can define the first i query-response pairs of the tuple v
Advantage. Let F i , G i be probabilistic oracle algorithms. We define advantage of the distinguisher A at distinguishing (
Theorem 1. (Strong Interpolation Theorem)
If there is a set of good views V good such that
Proof. Intuitively, a view of A G1,G2 is good with probability at least 1− ε ′ . Moreover, A obtains a good view v with almost same probability for both pairs of oracles up to a factor of (1 − ε). Then intuitively the distinguishing advantage of A should be bounded by ε + ε ′ . More precisely, we prove it as in below where V 1 denotes the set of all views v such that A returns 1 after obtaining the view 2 . V 0 denotes the set of all views v such that A doesn't returns 1 after obtaining the view. And let
Our proof is directly from the idea explained in [3] .
Indifferentiability
We give a brief introduction of indifferentiability and state significance of it. The following definition is a slightly modified version of the original definition [11, 5] , where the condition that the maximum number of message blocks queried by a distinguisher is σ is not described.
Definition 1. [11]
A Turing machine C with oracle access to an ideal primitive F is said to be (t A , t S , q, σ, ε)-indifferentiable from an ideal primitive G if there exists a simulator S such that for any distinguisher A it holds that :
The simulator S is an interactive algorithm which has oracle access to G and runs in time at most t S . The distinguisher A runs in time at most t A and makes at mostueries. The total message blocks queried by A is at most σ.
The following Theorem [11] due to Maurer et al. is related to this paper. We explain the theorem for random oracle model of hash functions. Suppose a hash function (in some design of iteration) H based on a random oracle (or an ideal cipher) F is indifferentiable from a random oracle G
In this paper we consider G and F as the arbitrary input length random oracle R and the fixed input length random oracle f , respectively. And C is the chopMD hash function. If chopMD f is (t A , t S , q, σ, ε)-indifferentiable from the random oracle R, we also say that the indifferentiability insecurity bound of chopMD f is ε.
Improved indifferentiability analysis of chopMD
Coron et al. [5] stated MD hash function is not indifferentiability-secure whereas prefix free MD construction or chopMD construction in random oracle (or in ideal cipher model) is secure against indifferentiability attack. In [5] , they had proved the following statement for a distinguisher which makes queries whose total number of message blocks is σ. And u is the random oracle from the set of all n + b bits to the set of n bits.
The indifferentiability insecurity for pfMD
Very recently, Maurer and Tessaro considered the combination of prefix free MD and chopMD [12] , i.e., choppfMD u pad . They proved that the indifferentiability insecurity for this combination is bounded by O(σ 2 /2 n ). This is an improved bound compare to the bound for chopMD. Since choppfMD outputs n − s bits, the security bound is beyond the birthday barrier. A prefix-padding may cost extra overhead in terms of efficiency and designs. In this section, we show that the the prefix-padding is not necessary to obtain the similar kind of bound.
In other words, we provide an improved bound of chopMD and the improved bound stated in this paper is (3(n − s) + 1)q/2 s + q/2 n−s−1 + σ 2 /2 n+1 where q denotes the the maximum number of queries for two oracles and σ is the total number of message blocks queried by a distinguisher. If we choose s = n/2 then to have a significant advantage, the total number of blocks of all queries should be at least 2 s /(3s+1) which is far beyond the birthday attack complexity.
The organization of section 3 is as follows. In subsection 3.1, we define a set of good views V 
Finally, based on Theorem 1 (strong interpolation theorem), we conclude in Theorem 3 that the indifferentiability insecurity bound of chopMD u is ε * = ε + ε ′ .
Interpolation probability of chopMD and its underlying random oracle
We first provide a lower bound on the number of functions when some inputsoutputs of f and MD f are known. More precisely, we want to compute the number of functions f such that
where a i ∈ {0, 1} n+b are distinct, M j ∈ ({0, 1} b ) + are distinct. Intuitively, we say the above set of relations is irreducible (see definition 2 in below) if
h j for all j = i. Thus, q 1 many outputs of MD f add q 1 more restrictions on the outputs of f besides q 2 many input-output relations of f . Hence the number of functions f should be close to 2 n(2 n+b −q1−q2) . In lemma 1 we will show that the number of functions is at least (1 − ν) × 2 n(2 n+b −q1−q2) for some positive ν (stated in the lemma 1) close to zero. The above statement is also equivalent to
Definition 2. The set of relations
n+b are distinct, h 1 , · · · , h q1 ∈ {0, 1} n are distinct from x i 's and IV and finally the value of MD O2 (M i ) is not determined from the re-
Remark 1. Intuitively, it says that there is no redundant relation in rel-A. All the inputs of O 1 and O 2 are distinct.
be irreducible then the number of functions f such that
where σ is the total number of message blocks queried. In other words,
Proof. See the appendix. Now we compute the joint probability for chopMD u and u. The next lemma is analogue version of Lemma 1 for chopMD hash function instead of MD hash function. Here, we allow collisions among outputs of chopMD. Intuitively, if chopMD u behaves as an uniform random function then Pr u [chopMD
ideally should be 1 2 nq 2 +(n−s)q 1 . Since chopMD u (M j ) = y j has some influence on the intermediate computations we would rather expect a probability close to the above probability. In lemma 2 we show that the for a given choices of inputs and outputs satisfying some conditions (stated in the lemma 2) the above probability is at least 1−∆ 2 nq 2 +(n−s)q 1 for some positive ∆ (defined in the lemma 2) which is close to zero for reasonable choices of parameters.
Lemma 2. The number of functions f such that
is at least |F | × 1−∆ 2 nq 2 +(n−s)q 1 where
Here, σ is the total number of message blocks queried. M i j 's are distinct elements from ({0, 1}
b ) + such that the value of MD f (M i ) is not determined from the relations f (x 1 , m 1 ) = z 1 , · · · , f (x q2 , m q2 ) = z q2 . The values of (x i , m i )'s are distinct elements from {0, 1} n × {0, 1} b . In terms of probability, we have
Proof. See the appendix.
By using lemma 2 we have similar result for chopMD u and u.
, the probability that v is a view when A is interacting with chopMD u and u, is at least
and σ is the total number of message blocks queried.
Interpolation probability of A Simulator and Random Oracle
Now we define a simulator S which almost behaves as a random oracle. Moreover, for an (n−s)-bit outputting random oracle R, responses of MD S will match with R. By the notation x ∈ R A we mean that x is chosen uniformly from A and it is independent with all previously defined random variables.
Definition of Simulator
Initialization :
On query S R (x, m) :
In 002, we have w ∈ R {0, 1} s \ {w ′ : w ′ y ∈ C ∪ {x}}. This is not possible if and only if the above set becomes empty. Note that after i th query the size of C is less than or equal to (2i + 1). Thus we assume that q 2 , the maximum number of queries to the simulator (and hence for oracle O 2 ) satisfies the condition 2q 2 + 2 < 2 s equivalently q 2 ≤ 2 s−1 − 2.
Some important observations
Distinct Query. Suppose A O1,O2 is an oracle algorithm where O 1 = R and O 2 = S R . Note that S R responses identically in identical queries and so does R. Same property is true for chopMD f and f . Hence we assume that all queries to O 1 and O 2 are distinct. chopMD S = R. All responses of S are distinct and distinct from IV and the first n-bits of all previous S-queries. Whenever MD S (M ) is computable from the all previous query-responses, we have chopMD Distribution. Because of the above two assumptions, the last (n−s) bits of outputs of S R (·) and outputs of R(·) are uniformly and independently distributed over the set {0, 1} n−s . By our assumption, whenever line002 is executed, A does not make (M ′ , m)-query to R. Thus, the output distribution of R(·) and S(·) are independent. Now, a typical view of A O1,O2 is a tuple
where
is not determined from the relations O 2 (x i , m i ) = z i . Now we compute the joint interpolation probabilities for S and R. More precisely, p := Pr[R(M j ) = h j ∀j and S(x i , m i ) = z i ∀i]. Since outputs of S and outputs of R are independently distributed, it is sufficient to compute the joint probabilities of S and R separately. Obviously, Pr[R(M j ) = h j ∀j] = 1 2 (n−s)q 1 . Now on i th query of S, the response of (x i , m i ) is z i with probability at most
ℓ i is the upper bound of the size of the set {w ′ : w ′ y ∈ C ∪ {x}} appeared in the i th query of S. Multiplying all these probabilities we obtain Pr[S(
It is easy to see that for any r-good view i ℓ i ≤ (2r + 1)q 2 . Thus, we have proved the following result.
, the probability that v is a view when A is interacting with the simulator S and a random oracle R, is at most
Indifferentiability Security Bound of chopMD
Now we compute ε and ε . When r = n − s, ε=
The Value of ε ′ . Now we compute ε ′ such that Pr[v G1,G2 ∈ V good ] ≥ 1 − ε ′ , where G 1 is the random oracle R and G 2 is the simulator S R . v G1,G2 ∈ V good means that the view v G1,G2 is r-good. Therefore, we have to prove that the upper bound of the probability that there is a r-multicollision among q uniformly and independently chosen (n − s)-bits is ε ′ . Let's compute this ε ′ as follows. Let us denote the µ(n − s, r, q) for the probability that there is a rmulticollision among q uniformly and independently chosen (n − s)-bits. Now it is easy to see that µ(n − s, r, q) ≤ ( q r ) 2 (n−s)(r−1) . Now we choose r = n − s and hence µ(n−s, r, q) ≤ (q/2 n−s−1 ) r ≤ q/2 n−s−1 if q ≤ 2 n−s−1 . Since chop(S(·)) and R(·) uniformly and independently distributed over {0, 1} n−s , a (n − s)-good view is obtained by A S,R with probability at least 1 − q/2 n−s−1 , where q = q 1 + q 2 . Therefore, we can choose ε ′ = q/2 n−s−1 when r = n − s. Now, by using proposition 1 and 2 and strong interpolation theorem we obtain our following main theorem of the section. Here, ε * = ε + ε ′ .
Theorem 3. The chopMD construction is (t A , t S , q, σ, ε * )-indifferentiable from a random oracle, in the random oracle model for the compression function, for any t A , with t S = ℓ · O(q 2 ) and ε
chopDBL hash functions and its security analysis
A r-multicollision for a hash function H is a r-set {X 1 , · · · , X r } such that H(X 1 ) = · · · = H(X r ). In [8] it is shown that the r-multicollision can be found in the classical MD hash function in roughly 2 n/2 complexity. For a random oracle it needs [14] roughly 2 n(r−1)/r complexity. Moreover, Kelsey-Schneier [9] found a second preimage attack which needs roughly 2 n/2 queries for classical MD hash function. But for a random oracle to have a second preimage attack we need at least 2 n queries. Thus MD hash function is not good in terms of multicollision and second-preimage attack. Lucks designed a wide pipe hash which is secure against these attacks.
We first define Lucks wide pipe design. In his design let F : {0, 1} w+b → {0, 1} w and g : {0, 1} w → {0, 1} n be two independently distributed random oracles. The wipe pipe hash [10] is defined as g(MD F (M )) for any padded message M . In [10] , it was shown that -the second preimage attack for the wide pipe hash needs min{2 w/2 , 2 n } complexity.
-the k-multicollision for the wide pipe hash needs min{2 w/2 , 2 n } complexity.
Here we show that the random oracle assumption of g is redundant. More precisely, we obtain almost similar bound when g is a simply chop function. Thus we define a chopDBL hash function as chopDBL F (m 1 , · · · , m ℓ ) = chop n (MD F (m 1 , · · · , m ℓ )).
One can compute F : {0, 1} 2n+b → {0, 1} 2n based on two independent random oracles f 1 , f 2 : {0, 1} 2n+b → {0, 1} n as F (X) = f 1 (X) f 2 (X). As shown in the last section, we have an improved security analysis for chopMD. By using Theorem 3 we know that chop n MD F is 2 n /(3n + 1)-indifferentiable secure.
Theorem 4. The chopDBL construction is (t A , t S , q, σ, ε)-indifferentiable from a random oracle, in the random oracle model for the compression function, for any t A , with t S = ℓ · O(q 2 ) and ε = O( nq 2 n + q 2 n + σ 2 2 2n ). The above theorem says that to have an indifferentiability attack we need at least 2 n /(3n+1) query complexity (the number of message blocks queried). Thus, if we can have second preimage attack of chopDBL withuery complexity then q ≥ 2 n /(3n + 1). Otherwise we can distinguish chopDBL from a random oracle with less queries than 2 n /(3n+1). A similar argument shows that r-multicollision attack needs at least minimum of 2 n(r−1)/r and 2 n /(3n + 1) queries. Thus in the random oracle model our new design of hash function is almost optimally secure (with respect to second preimage and multicollision).
In this paper, we present an improved security analysis for chopMD. This improved security analysis helps us how to get security beyond the birthday barrier. More precisely, we design an n-bit wide pipe hash function which has security level close to 2 n and hence we have beyond birthday barrier. The new design is much simpler and efficient. It would be interesting to see whether it preserves other properties more particularly, second preimage security.
